



#### Sidebar A: **Who Ate Captain Cook? Integral Historiography in a Postmodern Age**

Carla Fuentes gave a lengthy sidebar on “integral historiography,” which is not exactly my field, but certain points jumped out at me, and so, as usual, I furiously copied Kim’s notes. I also jotted down my own impressions. I got interested in it when I heard the title, “Who Ate Captain Cook?”—they really did roast and eat poor ole James Cook—and why this happened has apparently become the great debate of the decade in historiography, or the study of how to interpret history (and other cultures in general). It probably didn’t help that I had just seen *Hannibal*. Anyway, Fuentes gave one of her patented fire-on-fire lectures on the topic.

Throughout this seminar, in various sidebars, the profs keep talking about “the four quadrants.” Fuentes finally explained what they are, although nobody seemed bothered by the fact that “four” and “quadrant” are redundant. From what I could understand, the existence of the quadrants is even worst news for AI. I had already grasped the fact that AI was in deep trouble because it was caught in flatland, caught in the failure to grasp the spectrum of consciousness. But now, if I heard Fuentes correctly, the interior spectrum of consciousness in an individual is only one of the four quadrants, and AI doesn’t grasp them very well, either. Yikes!

Specifically, it seems that AI understands fairly well the computational and cognitive representation of exterior objects—what IC calls the Upper-Right quadrant. But AI fails to grasp or even acknowledge the interiors of individuals, or the whole Spiral of development—

that much I knew—which they call the Upper-Left quadrant; and it fails to grasp the communal quadrants, both cultural and social, or the Lower-Left and Lower-Right quadrants. This was much, much worse than I had imagined. The IC people kept saying that “consciousness is distributed across all four quadrants”—whatever that actually means, it means AI is in deep shit. Kim scribbled in the margins of her notes: “See ‘An Integral Theory of Consciousness’ and ‘Waves, Streams, States, and Self—Further Considerations for An Integral Theory of Consciousness,’ both published in the *Journal of Consciousness Studies* and summarized in ‘A Summary of My Psychological Model’ [posted on this site].” I bet she had read them, too, which was what was so annoying about Kim.

Anyway, we in AI already knew that AI is having enormous trouble getting any sort of software to perform nuanced interpretations. The four quadrants point out that interpretation also demands a cultural background and a social system, and thus, until we find ways to allow AI to grow in its own culture, it will never produce real intelligence. If what I understood about the four quadrants is true, then in order to create a fully functioning AI, we would have to (1) create the appropriate self-replicating hardware of almost infinite information storage that could reconfigure itself at the command of the internal AI; create software that at least registered faithfully the objective sensorimotor world and then demonstrated learning and creativity in that world; this hardware-software and its objective computational strategies is the Upper Right, and so far it is the only item of the four quadrants that AI even acknowledges; (2) create hardware and software that would allow the interiors, or *real self-consciousness*, to emerge, at which point that self-consciousness would begin *its own evolution* through its own Spiral of development (the Upper Left); but—and here is the added nightmare for AI: (3) individual interior evolution can only occur in a community of mutual understanding among similarly-depthed individuals (Lower Left); and further, (4) this cultural or intersubjective dimension would have to occur along with an exterior social system capable of supporting it (Lower Right). Put mildly, AI has its work cut out for it!

Well, my thoughts got ahead of my story. Here is Fuentes's talk, which introduces the quadrants and applies them to the interpretation of history and a lovely dinner featuring the Captain as main course. Exactly how all this will play out in AI is something I would definitely have to think about....

Carla Fuentes: "When we talk about an *integral historiography*, what do we really mean? The technical short answer is: an 'all quadrants, all levels, all lines, all states, all types' approach to the study of history. Of course, such an integral approach would, if done in a fairly complete fashion, involve dozens, hundreds, thousands of variables. But less extensive integral-historical studies can still be done, using the general outline, that would advance our understanding of history in substantial and significant ways. Let me briefly focus on the meaning of quadrants, levels, lines, states, and types, and show exactly what is involved in each case when applied to interpreting history. Exciting, huh?" A few in the audience laughed, but most seemed to mumble and groan.

"Kim, is this section any fun? It sounds about as thrilling as watching paint dry."

"I don't know, I've never heard this one before. But knowing how wild Fuentes is, if people start getting bored, she'll do a strip tease or something."

"Really?" *Love* that integral historiography.

"Start with the quadrants, eh, kidderooes? The four quadrants—and yes, 'four' is redundant, since 'quadrants' by itself means 'four areas'"—Fuentes seemed to stare directly at me and smile—"the quadrants refer to the fact that any occasion can be looked at from (at least) four major perspectives, which represent four actual dimensions of the occasion itself: I can look at the interior and the exterior of the individual and the collective, which gives me four basic views that need to be incorporated in any integral or comprehensive understanding of that occasion." [See fig. 1 in the Introduction to *Collected Works*, vol. 7, posted on this site, which is a diagram of the four quadrants as they appear in humans.] Fuentes shot across the stage, a series of light-and-shadows as the lamps played off her.

“Let’s say I am studying a chimpanzee. Why on earth I would want to is another question. Okay, I can look at the chimp both as an individual and as a member of a group. And *both* the individual and the group have an inside and an outside. Thus, for the exterior of the individual, I can simply describe the chimp’s observable, empirical behavior as he goes on about his day’s activities. But to understand his interiors, I have to try to figure out what is motivating the chimp, what his desires are, what rudimentary feelings he might be having, what proto-value systems he has constructed, and so on. As many of you know, chimps can use a quite complicated system of symbols and signs, which suggests that there is some sort of interior understanding of those symbols—there is some sort of consciousness, meaning, and intentionality.

“So, the observable behavior of the chimp we call the Upper-Right quadrant, and the interior consciousness (along with its symbols, meanings, values, and motivations) we call the Upper-Left quadrant. That gives us two very different approaches to understanding the chimp: one is behaviorism, the other is hermeneutics; the former merely describes what an entity *does*, the latter attempts to understand what it *means*.

“Go one step further. No chimp is an island unto himself.” Fuentes looked up and laughed, joined by virtually nobody. “Well, anyway, no individual evolves, or therefore exists, on its own. A chimp must therefore also be studied, not just as a *whole* entity itself, but as a *part* of other wholes, such as a member of a group (which in turn is a part of even larger wholes, ad infinitum). And the group, like the individual, can be looked at from the outside and from the inside.

“Studying it from the outside, you simply *describe the behavior of the group* as carefully as you can (just as when studying an individual using an exterior approach, you simply describe the individual’s behavior as carefully as possible). You might note the group’s reproduction patterns, its eating habits, its daily activities, its seasonal migration routes, the number of births and deaths, and so on. But you can also attempt to understand the group *from within*. That is, if an individual chimp has some sort of proto-meaning and

value system (and nobody doubts that it does), then that chimp certainly shares that meaning with its cohorts, and, in fact, it developed its meaning and values only through a mutual development with others in the group.

“So, once again, when you study the exteriors of the collective, you ask, ‘*What does it do?*’ When you study the interiors, you ask, ‘*What does it mean?*’

“Now obviously attempting to interpret the values of a group of chimps is hard—but hell, folks, interpreting the values of any ‘Other’ is goddam hard!” Fuentes glared at the audience. “That is what the culture wars are all about, especially when it comes to history! How to understand the Other! The researchers that we admire in the field of primate study—researchers such as Jane Goodall—are precisely those who carefully and meticulously applied all four quadrants to the sentient beings they were studying: they described the exterior behavior of the individual and the group, but they also attempted to find and share some of the interior meanings and values of the individual and the group. Obviously, you don’t want to anthropomorphize chimp interiors; but at the same time, you don’t want to anthropocentrically deny that other animals have interiors! So if you want an integral approach to any sentient being, including humans and their history, then you want to include all four quadrants: the interior and exterior of the individual and the collective. Yes? Yes! Okay then, glad that went so easily.” She smiled good-naturedly and zinged back across the stage.

“All right, so let’s take this and apply it to the study of history, which is first and foremost the study of the Other. Either the Other in (cultural) space or the Other in (historical) time. Or both. When we study other groups, they are usually Other at least in space, separated from us by some sort of distance; and they are often Other in time, separated from us by history. When we study our own history, we are also studying an Other in time: namely, ourselves as we were yesterday; and the actual space has also changed to some degree, hasn’t it? But then, time and space are two parts of the same curved universe,

wouldn't Mr. E say? So here it is: All history is the study of an Other in spacetime. And in order to understand any Other in spacetime, we need the four quadrants. Is that clear?"

The audience was totally silent.

"I thought so. Okay, okay, okay, you numbskulls. We can do this in a much more fun fashion by looking at the recent food fight in anthropology between Marshall Sahlins and Gananath Obeyesekere. This was, and is—it's still unfolding—the funnest, sharpest, nastiest dustup we have had in the field since Derek Freeman dismantled Margaret Mead in the 1980s. To make matters more interesting, this present argument is generated almost solely by the fact that neither of these gentleman is taking an integral approach (as neither Freeman nor Mead did), and therefore they are *each* using the *true half* of their positions to demolish the *false half* of the other guy's position. Naturally, both of them think they have won the debate. Well, they both did win, *half way*. But they have both left out the crucial other half of the story.

"Their dustup is, in fact, the standard fight in today's academic culture wars: the fight between facts and interpretations; or between 'scientific historiography' and 'hermeneutic historiography'; or between modernism and postmodernism; or between orange and green; or between the Right-Hand and the Left-Hand approaches. It all boils down to this: On the one hand (i.e., the Right Hand), we have the modern, orange, scientific meme, which believes that fundamentally there are only empirical facts in the world ('The world is sum total of facts,' as the logical positivists would put it), and thus there is one, true, universal, empirical account of history that tells things the way 'they really were.' On the other hand (i.e., the Left Hand), we have the postmodern, green, pluralist meme, which believes that there are 'no facts, only interpretations,' and thus it believes that there is no objective reality and therefore there is no single metanarrative governing history or its interpretation; that there are instead multiple, local stories, none of which can be reduced to universal abstract frameworks; that accordingly we do not discover history but invent it, or create it as our own interpretations. Both camps, of course, absolutely despise the other.

“And both of them are half-right, half-wrong. It is not a contest of facts versus interpretations—it is NOT a contest between ‘there are no interpretations, only facts’ and ‘there are no facts, only interpretations.’ *Both* facts and interpretations are *integral* to every event, because *every* event has Right- and Left-Hand dimensions.

“FACTS—that is, the objective, sensorimotor aspects of all occasions (i.e., the exterior aspects of both individuals and collectives—or the Upper-Right and Lower-Right quadrants)—those aspects do indeed present themselves as facts, as objectively real occasions—and, all things considered, they are indeed objective facts (or close enough for practical purposes!). A diamond will cut a piece of glass, no matter what culture they are found in. And apples fall from trees to the ground in every culture they are found in. Those are facts, not interpretations. And facts are grounded in a *good-enough objectivity* (as all Right-Hand occasions are). *End of that part of the discussion!*” Fuentes smiled.

“But all exteriors have interiors; all facts have interpretations. We cannot separate facts and interpretations in any occasion; but that does *not* mean that we can therefore deny the distinction between them and use that illegitimate blur to jettison one of them, which is exactly what both parties do. Orange claims to present just the facts and dispense with interpretations (which is simply the way that orange itself *interprets* the world!); and green dismisses facts and insists that there are only interpretations (which it claims is objectively or *factually true* for all cultures!). Well, a pox on both their houses, eh?

“So here is what we at IC suggest: using empirical, objective, scientific methods, you can approach any event and attempt to determine its exterior, objective, ‘factual’ features. All of the Right-Hand aspects of events are concretely factual in that sense; they are located in sensorimotor space, you can see them, touch them, feel them, put your finger on them, more or less. Atoms, molecules, cells, organisms, ecosystem, modes of production (foraging, horticultural, agrarian, industrial), the biosphere—you can see all of those. They are empirical, they are there. An apple will fall to the ground at the same speed in a foraging, horticultural, and industrial culture. Even a postmodernist will jump out of the way of an

oncoming bus, because that bus is a fact, not an interpretation! I will believe an extreme postmodernist IF he will stand in front of the oncoming bus, announce that it is not a fact but merely an interpretation, and then stand there. I will then apologize to the corpse. But until a postmodernist does that, he can just shut the fuck up!” Fuentes yelled, then laughed, then looked at everybody, her wide grin returning to a soft smile that hinted how non-seriously she took herself.

“The point is simply that a good-enough objectivity inhabits all the Right-Hand quadrants. And the orange-scientific approaches to history are dedicated to *discovering* (not inventing) those objective facts. That is entirely appropriate and correct, as far as it goes.

“But what those objects *mean*, well, that is a Left-Hand affair: an affair of the interiors, of hermeneutics, of consciousness and introspection, mutual understanding, shared meanings and values and motivations and cultural contexts. Not just what does it do?, but what does it mean? And here science fails us rather completely. You can’t see meaning. It’s not empirical. You can’t see it with a microscope, telescope, photographic plate, MRI or CAT or PET or nuttin. Meaning, value, mutual understanding, interpretation—all of these escape the net of narrow empirical science. They are, rather, the province of the Left-Hand approaches—of phenomenology, hermeneutics, *verstehen* approaches, mutual understanding, introspection, interpretation, empathic resonance. What does it *mean*? Both for me and for the Other?

“Furthermore, there appear to be many different *types* and even *levels* of interpretation. We have been tentatively using Spiral Dynamics, for instance (while not denying the usefulness of other models). Using Spiral Dynamics as an example of a possible interpretive repertoire, then for any given sensorimotor fact, you can have a red interpretation of its meaning, a blue interpretation of its meaning, an orange interpretation, a green interpretation, a yellow interpretation, and so on. This does not mean the sensorimotor fact is not there; it simply means that the *meaning* and *value* of the fact *reside* in the stage (the actual structure) of the consciousness that *perceives* the fact. And therefore

an integral historiography would take ALL OF THAT INTO ACCOUNT—it would include the vast array of Right-Hand facts and the full spectrum of Left-Hand interpretations—as I will try to demonstrate in several examples that follow—particularly the Sahlins-Obeyesekere food fight.” She again laughed, popping along on the furiously sizzling energy that was Carla Fuentes.

“But let’s start with a very simple example to show what is involved. In the main lecture we used the case of Christopher Columbus. The facts are these: Columbus was born in Genoa, Italy, in 1451; in the mid 1470s he made his first trading voyage in the Aegean Sea. He eventually approached King Ferdinand V and Queen Isabella I of Spain, who agreed to sponsor an expedition sailing across the Atlantic in search of a western passage to China. The fleet of three ships—the Nina, the Pinta, and the Santa Maria—sailed from Palos, Spain, on a date that we call August 3, 1492. Land was sighted on October 12, and they landed on Guanahani in the Bahamas. In this and three subsequent voyages, Columbus landed on spots now called Cuba, Haiti, Panama, Antigua, and Trinidad, among others. He died in Spain at the age of 55.

“Now, it very important to note, right at the beginning, that those *facts* are *uncontested* by either school. Those empirical facts, discovered by orange historical science, are uncontested even by green postmodernism. Of course, green is very, very quiet about that, because it wants to throw up a huge smoke screen of Theory, radical hermeneutics, and poststructural posturings in order to claim that there are *no* facts, *only* interpretations. But in actuality it accepts all of those basic facts discovered by orange historical approaches. You see, green wants to claim that Columbus was a cultural criminal, and it can only do so if it accepts the above facts so it can get its story going. So it very quietly accepts those facts, and then goes on about its business of claiming that there are no facts, only interpretations.

“It then *gives* to those facts a green—and often mean-green meme—interpretation: Christopher Columbus was a carrier of patriarchal, analytic-dissociative, marginalizing, hierarchical, crushingly oppressive values, which brutally disrupted the peaceful, pluralistic,

loving paradise of the indigenous peoples, infecting them with smallpox, pellagra, the heartbreak of psoriasis, tooth decay, and the first of what would eventually become airline food.

“Well, you get the point. But I’m being too hard on green, because my overall point is that green has a very important piece of the integral puzzle. So let us note two very important items here. The first is that the basic orange history *facts* are not contested by either orange or green. They are accepted. As well they should be. The difficulty arises when it comes to the meaning and interpretation of those facts—in this case, the meaning of Columbus’s voyage, what it really did to the ‘new world,’ whether that was a good thing or a horrible thing, and so on. Because at this point, orange and green aggressively go their separate ways. Orange insists on presenting only the facts (or the Right-Hand aspects of all events)—and thus ends up *unknowingly* sneaking its own orange interpretations into those facts. And green insists on presenting only the interpretations (or the Left-Hand aspects of all events), but in doing so, not only does it hypocritically deny the existence of facts that it actually accepts, it also insists that its particular type of interpretation is the only interpretation that is allowed. Thus the green meme, starting with its incredibly important insight that interpretation is unavoidable in any endeavor, slips all too quickly into the MGM, and boomeritis soon inhabits most schools of postmodern anthropology and historiography. Postmodern poststructuralism—PMS—soon dominates the mood of academic historiography, with not altogether happy results.” Fuentes grinned to herself.

“So I hope that you can start to see why those approaches are both partially right and partially wrong. Orange scientific historiography works within a good-enough objectivity in order to discover the empirical, sensorimotor facts as they actually were. Those facts are there; those objective features are there. It doesn’t really matter that orange science, especially in its early years—yes, around the Enlightenment—imagined that formal-rational reporting of sensorimotor facts was the ONLY truth in the entire world; it does not matter that orange science overestimated its own capacity, the certainty of its knowledge, or the

importance of its own existence. Every adolescent does that. And subsequent science would be much more realistic about what it could, and could not, do.” Fuentes looked up and smiled, then in her near-yelling voice again: “But one of the things that science *could* do was put a fucking man on the fucking moon!—a feat that poetry has yet to match. So the silly sleight of hand of postmodern poststructuralism, that crabby PMS mentality that claims there is no real difference between fact and fiction, history and myth, science and poetry, is yet further hypocrisy on the part of the extreme postmodernists, yes? Okay then!” She grinned wickedly and looked around the audience, apparently checking to see if she had managed to annoy anybody.

In softer tones: “The point is that orange science delivers a good-enough objective truth, and those basic sensorimotor truths—water is composed of one oxygen and two hydrogen atoms, DNA carries nucleotides, apples fall at the same rate of acceleration in all cultures, that sort of thing—those truths are universal and cross-cultural. You know: a diamond will cut a piece of glass in every known culture. So those are the true aspects of orange science that any integral approach would want to include in any comprehensive methodology. I will give some specific examples of this in a moment, particularly with regard to dear Captain Cook, examples that are again *uncontested* by both orange science and green pluralism.

“But the problem—and it was a big problem—is that orange science did not just report on the sensorimotor facts as it discovered them. Orange science failed—almost completely—to realize that the worldview that claimed that there are ONLY empirical facts was actually an *interpretation* NOT given by the facts; and further, that interpretation was nothing but the worldview of the orange wave of consciousness. No other meme, stage, or wave of development—higher or lower—believes that there are only empirical facts.

“So, of course, the very next wave of consciousness was the first to spot that oppressive restriction by orange. The world is not the sum total of facts; the world is the sum total of facts and interpretations. But no sooner had green discovered this than it

ricocheted to the opposite extreme: there are no facts, only interpretations. Jumping out of the frying pan and into the fire, boomeritis was born. The world was nothing but silly putty, a plastic that could be interpreted and molded to any shape by an ego demanding that ‘Nobody tells me what to do!’ All facts are merely social constructions, and off we go with that boomeritis mess....

“So green heroically demanded that interpretations be introduced into the fabric of reality, which is quite correct. But it failed to see that there are a spectrum of interpretations, and that its own interpretation of the world—namely, that there are only interpretations, no facts; that all truths are culturally relative; that there is only a plurality of irreducible ultimates; that all hierarchies are oppressive; and that there are no universals—it failed to see that *this is the worldview of only one stage of consciousness development*. No other meme, stage, or wave of development—higher or lower—believes solely in pluralistic relativism. No other wave believes there are only interpretations.

“So green ended up doing exactly what orange did—which is what *every* first-tier meme does: imagines that its view is the only view that is fundamentally correct. And so began the culture wars in historiography: should the text of history be read by orange modern science—universal, monological, factual, empirical, telling it like it really was—or by green postmodernism—interpretive, pluralistic, relative, local, multiple? The answer of an integral second-tier historiography would be that *both* are required because both have an important piece of the puzzle, something that neither of them will admit. That, of course, is why a truly integral historiography is slow to emerge in academia, which is committed to the ugly battle between those two first-tier memes, each of them brutally partial... and thus brutalizing in their reading of history.

“To the Sahlins-Obeyesekere skirmish.” Fuentes looked up and smiled, somewhat wearily, then leaped, jolted, back into the presentation. Noticing that the audience was drifting, she slammed into high-octane Fuentes. “Sahlins and Obeyesekere. We’re talking a

clash of midgets here, folks,” she laughed. “God I love the smell of politically incorrect thinking in the morning!”

Fuentes peered around the room. “Oh good grief, lighten up, you hyper-sensitive toadies. Have you ever noticed that the cool colors in *Spiral Dynamics*—purple, blue, green—have no sense of humor? The cool colors are supposed to be communally oriented, not individualistic, and I think that’s why they don’t really allow humor—humor disturbs group-think, humor disrupts the herd mentality. Yessirree, boys and girls, enter a green group and you’re in a humor-free zone. Well, I digress.” She looked out at the audience, slapped her knee, and zipped across the stage.

Kim leaned over and whispered, “She’s baiting the crowd.”

“I know, I already wrote that in my notes, but I’m still uncomfortable with it,” I said.

“Ah, poor little Ken is a poor little greenie,” Kim smiled.

“Yeah, well, what can I say?”

“The Sahlins-Obeyesekere debate concerns the meaning of what happened to Captain James Cook when he first bumped into Hawaii. He was, you know, sailing along, minding his own business, when Wham! Friggin island right in the middle of friggin nowhere. Go figure. Well, here are the facts: in January 1779, Captain Cook and his crew landed at Kealakekua Bay. Cook was greeted by the natives and treated as someone of very high rank—a chieftain or possibly even a god—and accordingly taken to the temple and given several worshipful ceremonies. Cook departed the island in February but had to return ten days later due to a sprung mast. This time the natives greeted him with insolence and eventually violence: he was set upon, killed, dismembered, and eaten.

“The question naturally arises, why did those events happen? How can we understand them, what do they mean? Sahlins and Obeyesekere have two diametrically opposed answers.

“Before we give the opposing sides, let us again note a crucial item: both sides accept the basic *facts* as I stated them. Not even Sahlins, representing the postmodern side, actually denies those facts (although, again, the postmodern side is very, very quiet about that). So

the first item in any integral historiography is a lying out of the empirical facts of the matter as best as a scientific-type investigation can allow—a setting forth of the Right-Hand quadrants, a setting-forth of the good-enough objective accounts of just which piece of sensorimotor matter went where, when.

“Now, once we have accepted the general facts of the matter—as both sides explicitly or implicitly do—then we get down to the disagreements, which concern, first and foremost, *how are we to interpret these facts?* What was going on in the minds of the natives such that they would act this way? How are we to understand these actions of the Other? (Secondarily, there are disagreements about some of the actual facts themselves—e.g., exactly when did the ceremony called the Makahiki start and end?—a fact that turns out to be crucially important; but those facts, both sides agree, are to be decided by more scientific-type research and inquiry. The real disagreement concerns the meaning and interpretations of those facts.)

“Okey dokey,” Fuentes smiled. “Now what *generally* happens is that the orange-science side claims that they will just present the facts of the matter, determined empirically, and any interpretations that are required will simply be *commonsense* interpretations that virtually anybody can make. Now in practice this means that orange simply *smuggles* its formal-rational interpretations into its presentation of the facts. (This is what has led to charges that orange rationality is actually Eurocentric—a claim that is half-true, half-false. Orange rational science is universal in its capacity—precisely because a diamond will cut a piece of glass in any culture it is found—and therefore universal empirical science can be adopted and used by anybody, in any culture, with the requisite capacity, because it produces a good-enough universal disclosure of sensorimotor truths; but the claims *surrounding* the use of orange rationality—such as: scientific materialism is the *only* true approach to the world; formal-operational rationality is the highest level of development; orange values are the only values that ought to be accepted by the world—well, those claims are *not* part of universal science but of imperial scientism, which is indeed mostly Eurocentric, at least to date. But we

refuse to toss the baby of universal science with the bathwater of scientism; the former is part of any integral historiography, the latter is a pathology we could all do without.)”

Carla Fuentes looked temporarily distracted. “Snap, crackle, pop, where the hell was I? Oh, yes. In practice, even though orange says it is presenting ‘just the facts,’ it actually *interprets* those facts using a commonsense practical rationality that it *assumes* is just as universal as the empirical facts that it is presenting. Those empirical facts are indeed universal, but the orange interpretation of them is not! And let me tell you, the natives were NOT using orange scientific rationality when they toasted, roasted, and nibbled the night away on dear ole James Cook. They did not interpret those facts using orange; they did not see those facts through an orange lens; they did not react to those facts with orange values. Rather, in most cases, it seems much more likely that they saw those facts through the eyes of the red meme. If we make that assumption, at least as very loose heuristic device, then every one of the natives’ actions makes a great deal of sense; there is a genuine ‘logic’ or ‘rationality’ to their actions, but the rationality is not that of orange (or of orange-science historians, either, it is important to note), but rather the ‘logic’ of red.

“Now, in the most general sense, that is exactly what Marshall Sahlins attempts to demonstrate. Namely, that the psychological and cultural *interiors* of the natives had a type of *mythic structure* (or, in the case of Spiral Dynamics, a red structure), and this structure *predisposed* the natives to *perceive* the sensorimotor facts within a meaning structure of mythological patterns that strongly inclined them to actually *see* Captain Cook as a manifestation of the god Lono and hence worship him as divine. But when Cook returned, the ceremonial season was no longer under the rule of Lono but of the warrior God Ku, and therefore Cook was brutally killed as Ku eclipsed Lono.”

Carla Fuentes looked up slowly from her notes and smiled. “Sahlins’s presentation of this thesis is really quite brilliant. I said this was a battle of midgets? If you’re still stinging from that comment, you’re still green. Of course I was kidding, you humorless toads,” she laughed warmly. “The fact is, Sahlins is a bit of a genius, truly, and Obeyesekere is a damned

good historian. Sahlins presents his case in two books: *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of the Sandwich Islands Kingdom* and—partly in response to Obeyesekere—*How ‘Natives’ Think: About Captain Cook, For Example*. Now I myself don’t agree with all of Sahlins’s interpretations. After all—and I will try to clarify this in a moment—we at IC believe that there is not just a random plurality of worldviews, as Sahlins the good postmodernist does, but that there is also a developmental or genealogical unfolding of worldviews, each of which builds upon its predecessor(s) and thus shows various degrees of social learning. We believe Sahlins’s case would be stronger and more accurate were he to make use of the full spectrum of consciousness and the full Spiral of development. So I would take issue with many of his specific interpretive details—some of them just don’t add up by any worldview. Still, his basic approach is as sound as it is important: individuals see facts through their interpretive apparatus. If we want to *understand* their behavior (Left Hand) and not merely *describe* it (Right Hand), then we must attempt to see their actions ‘from within.’

“Now, this is where the school of *structuralism* was such a revolutionary, breakthrough formulation (a school that Sahlins draws on). It gave us both a new way to look at cultures from without—namely, through structures of cognition that were similar to a grammar or syntax of perception—and a new way to try to understand cultures from within—namely, via a hermeneutic derived from the general structuralist understanding that we do not merely *perceive* the world, we *construct* it. Structuralism, following in the footprints of the likes of Kant and Saussure, was the first great school of sociological *constructivism*, and its impact is simply impossible to overestimate. Even though the original formulations of structuralism—as suggested by, e.g., Levi-Strauss—were found to be inadequate in almost every way, it set off a series of revolutions that are still with us today. After all, it was upon these great structuralist discoveries that more adequate neostructuralist approaches were built—from Jean Piaget to Jürgen Habermas to Clare Graves to Robert Kegan to Carol Gilligan. But also upon the original structuralist breakthroughs, the entire

movement of postmodern *poststructuralism* was built: in short, without structuralism, there would be no Foucault, no Derrida, no Lyotard.

“In fact, much of postmodernism itself is really poststructuralism. To understand why, we need look no further than another pioneer of early structuralism—and probably the most influential of all—Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure, writing in the early 1900s, was the first to point out that language itself is an organic whole, a *holistic system* that is not an assembly of separate elements but a richly interwoven pattern of relationships. Every word has meaning only in terms of its context. The ‘bark of a dog’ and the ‘bark of a tree’ are obviously two very different things, even though the same word ‘bark’ is used—the *context* of the phrase determines the *meaning* of word. Likewise, the context of the sentence determines the meaning of the phrase; and the context of the entire language determines the meaning of the sentence... and so on ad infinitum. That was the real meaning of the word ‘structure’—it was not a rigid box, but a dynamically transforming pattern of relationships in an endlessly holistic system. A truly awesome second-tier idea!

“And that was *the* crucial insight that permeated not only structuralism but poststructuralism. Thus, even today, no less an authority than Jonathan Culler can summarize the entire essence of Derrida’s deconstruction with two sentences: ‘All meaning is context-dependent,’ and ‘Contexts are boundless.’ This is why postmodernism is indeed postSTRUCTURALISM. Without the breakthrough insights of structuralism (and the holistic nature of all contexts), there would be no poststructuralism to speak of.

“But postmodernism is also POSTstructuralism, which attempts to come to terms with some of the inherent flaws in the original structuralist formulations. We will return to these flaws in a moment and give a rundown of the various ways that arose to overcome them.

“Okay, you bean bags. For now, all we note is that the best of structuralism (and certainly neostructuralism) is, first and foremost, a second-tier holism. Structuralism in almost any form was badly misunderstood and aggressively attacked by the green meme when

it began its PMS riots of deconstruction, which is unfortunate but perhaps predictable. But the fact is, structuralism sees the world as composed of holistic patterns of autopoietic or self-maintaining systems of relationships. When it comes to individuals and cultures, structuralism maintains that all of us contain internal cognitive-linguistic maps that influence how we perceive, and therefore actually co-create, our world. We can find this important structuralist influence in almost every developmental psychology today, which sees each wave of development as possessing a patterned wholeness that influences how individuals at that wave see the world. The memes of Spiral Dynamics, for example, are examples of structures. Jean Gebser's archaic, magic, mythic, rational, and integral worldviews are all structures. So are the stages of Jane Loevinger, Carol Gilligan, Jenny Wade, Patricia Arlin, Cheryl Armon, and so on. We also see it in the postmodern poststructuralist claim that because we *construct* the world, we can *deconstruct* it (even if they went a bit overboard there.)

“Perhaps we can see that, in a sense, ‘structuralism’ was a very unfortunate name, because it implies rigid and fixed boxes that dictate how people think. Well, no wonder the mean green meme reacted to that! And no wonder the rioting Parisian students in ’68 scrawled ‘Down with Structuralism’ on the walls of the city. ‘Structuralism’ should have been named something like ‘Patterned Relational Holism,’ and it perhaps it would have fared better!

“But perhaps not. As we said, the early forms of structuralism had a series of truly fatal flaws (apart from the true and enduring contributions). First and foremost is that the holistic patterns themselves were conceived as being *ahistorical*. That is, although they were dynamic transformational patterns in the world, taking raw sensations and fluidly converting them into meaningful perceptions, the patterns themselves were viewed in a very unyielding fashion. The ‘deep structure’ itself, although constantly dynamic, was said to be synchronic, which means that the rules governing it were not touched by history, nor did they evolve in

time; whereas the ‘surface structures’ of behavior of individuals were said to be diachronic, or existing in time and its fluctuations.

“Now the early structuralists had their reasons for claiming that the deep structures didn’t interact with history.” Carla looked up and shot us all that devilish grin. “If you have ever tried arguing with, say, a blue-meme Christian fundamentalist, you will find that it’s almost impossible for you to change its mind. You can present a ton of scientific evidence—the fossil record, for example—showing that the universe was not created in 6 days, and it won’t have any impact. ‘Oh, the fossil record; yes, the Lord created that on the fourth day.’” Everybody laughed; Carla, too. “The structures of these waves—blue, orange, green, any of them, really—often appear *impervious* to outside influence. That, of course, is one of their strengths in the overall course of evolution—these mental structures are durable, tested ways to survive in particular life conditions, and if they changed on the spot according to every little twitch in the road, humanity would almost certainly never have survived past beige. No, these structures—like *every* structure in the human organism—the structure of the heart, the brain, the kidneys—are harder to change than the Pope’s mind,” and Carla again slapped her thigh and laughed out loud. “Oh, I’ll get in trouble for that one. It’s a good thing I work at IC and not a university; I’d be up on charges faster than Madonna takes her clothes off.” Fuentes continued smiling, almost to herself, zinging across the stage. “Let’s just say, organic structures are harder to change than a leopard’s spots.

“But, of course, leopards’ spots can change—and they did in fact *evolve in the first place*. That was the fundamental problem with original structuralism: it did not fit with any evolutionary scheme since history supposedly never touched its holistic patterns. Whooh, huge mistake, huh? It was the ahistorical nature of the structures that was their undoing. But, to make a long story short, all forms of neostructuralism today make it very clear that: (1) the deep structures or holistic patterns themselves are in relationships with other structures/patterns/waves at all levels—these holistic structures are holons like everything else in the Kosmos; they are set in multiple contexts that help determine their own meaning.

And (2) these deep structures—and not just the surface structures—*themselves evolved*. The holistic relational patterns of perception themselves evolved—again: not just their surface structures but their deep structures were molded by time, evolution, and history. Put simply, worldviews evolved, memes evolved, waves evolved. And, many schools add, each subsequent structure transcended and included its predecessor(s), just like virtually all other structures in natural evolution: atoms are transcended but included in molecules, which are transcended but included in cells, which are transcended but included in organisms, and so on. Each whole wave of development becomes a part of the whole of the next. Each wave is a holon, a whole/part, indefinitely—which is the same general idea as: meaning is context-bound, and contexts are boundless: each whole is also a part of another whole, endlessly.

“And, in fact, once you see that, then it is a very short step to easily *integrate* the best of structuralism (each whole is also a part: meaning is context-bound) and poststructuralism (contexts are boundless, or endlessly sliding), which is what one of my colleagues did in a book called *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*. But, um, between you and me, don’t buy that book, because I’m telling ya, there’s no sex in it. I mean, I was ripping through there looking for the dirty pictures, right? Nothing! And the thing costs like \$40 bucks. Forget it, man.

“Okay, to the issue at hand—the Sahlins-Obeyesekere debate. With that background, we can again pick up the story. Sahlins is coming out of the general structuralist background—he therefore knows that we do not merely perceive the world, we co-create it. Upon a sensorimotor world of facts, we construct social realities. (We do not create the sensorimotor facts, although those facts *co-create each other*, since every holon has four quadrants, even at the sensorimotor level, and thus even atoms are co-creating and interpreting each other—a very technical point explained in SES. For now, the simple idea is exactly as the title of John Searle’s recent book put it: *The Construction of Social Reality*—and NOT ‘the social construction of reality.’ As we said, the sensorimotor facts are there in some fundamental sense, and upon those facts different worldviews are constructed,

worldviews that themselves contain other facts, values, meanings, and depths *not* found in the sensorimotor world: but that sensorimotor world does not therefore evaporate. The very real downside of both structuralism and poststructuralism was that, in clearly understanding that much of the world is a social construction, they both could slide easily into the mistaken notion that there are no sensorimotor facts of any kind, a notion taken to extremes with a postmodern poststructuralism driven by boomeritis and the demand that ‘Nobody tells me what to do!’)

“Now Sahlins is a postmodernist in good standing—that is, he has moved from structuralism to a type of poststructuralism—so he tilts into the ‘there are no facts, only interpretations’ school. That is, he is a good green-meme historian. But that doesn’t detract from the true aspects of postmodern poststructuralism, namely, that the cognitive maps we carry in our heads construct much of the social realities we ‘see’ around us. This is why Sahlins gives such a brilliant and compelling reading of how a mythic map or worldview might perceive this white dude popping off a huge ship and sloshing ashore on your islands. And how, a few weeks later, it might see something very different indeed and proceed to brutally murder and eat the person they previously divinized. Great stuff, folks!

“Here is where it starts to get funny, and complicated. Sahlins, as a good green-meme historian, maintains that different cultures have different worldviews, but you cannot say that one is better than the other, or that one has more truth than another, or make any sort of universal judgments of better or worse. He does not believe, as a second-tier historian would, that some universal judgments can in fact be made between cultures. As we have seen, the general PMS theorists maintain that you cannot make any universal judgments between cultures, even though the PMS crowd makes tons of universal judgments about Western culture, the Enlightenment, the patriarchy, and so on. What they mean is, no universal judgments except their own have any value, a fine boomeritis move if ever there was one. And, as we will see, Sahlins himself falls into this performative contradiction quite often.

“Sahlins, as the sensitive green-meme historian, says, and I quote: ‘I want to suggest that one cannot do good history, nor even contemporary history, without regard for the ideas, actions, and ontologies that are not and never were our own. Different cultures, different rationalities.’ So Sahlins sees his attempt to get inside the different rationality of the tribal Hawaiians as a sympathetic attempt to understand the Other on its own terms, and not on Western Eurocentric terms. He does not want to impose our Western ‘rationality’ on the tribal Hawaiian ‘rationality.’ He does not want to be Eurocentric and ethnocentric.

“Which is exactly what Obeyesekere accuses him of. Obeyesekere suggests that Sahlins is being Eurocentric, ethnocentric, and racist to the core, especially in pretending not to be. Obeyesekere claims, with considerable evidence, that the idea that the Hawaiians would see Cook as a god was a European myth itself, reflecting the godlike assumptions of how great European culture was: the poor natives are so stupid they thought we were really gods! To make matters worse for Sahlins, Obeyesekere is a Sri Lankan, a non-European (which, in the eyes of PMS, gives him a major trump card right there), and Obeyesekere himself suggests that, being a non-European, he can spot European bullshit when he sees it, and Sahlins’s entire account falls pretty much into that category.

“Sahlins, you can imagine, went ballistic. The one thing you don’t want to call a green meme is insensitive. Them’s fightin’ words, son. The ensuing all-out brawl, carried in the pages of everything from the *New York Review of Books* to the *Times Literary Supplement*, and wonderfully full of ad hominem barbs from both sides, involved, in fact, a classic fight between a green-meme historian and an orange-meme historian. Even though Obeyesekere is Sri Lankan, he was arguing for a universal practical rationality on the part of the natives. He maintained, with considerable evidence, that the natives did what common sense and practical rationality would do—the same kind of practical rationality you and I might use. As a theorist sympathetic with Obeyesekere’s orange-meme historiography put it:

The actions of the islanders toward the English can be explained in ways that are perfectly understandable in human terms [i.e., universal terms] without recourse to any structuralist [or poststructuralist] cultural theory. On Hawaii, the English were more warmly received from the outset, but a killing at the point of first contact taught the islanders the power and menace of the strangers. In both cases, once it became clear to the natives that the English were only visitors and not conquerors, things improved to the point where something like normal diplomatic relations between people from such divergent backgrounds could be established [because they share to various degrees the same universal world]. This is the commonsense view, so derided by [Sahlins, Denning, etc.], to which all the evidence clearly points. Why have structuralists been so reluctant to accept it? (88)

“By ‘structuralist,’ of course, he means structuralism and especially poststructuralism, both of which agree that the world is not the sum of facts, but the sum of facts and interpretations (even if they overdo the latter). The orange meme wants to argue for *one world* of common facts, which the scientific historian can discover; the green meme wants to argue for a *pluralistic world* of irreducible interpretations, which the postmodern historian must co-create. (The integral approach insists on both, as we have seen, and has a specific methodology which includes both—see below.)

“Obeyesekere, as the good orange-meme historian, even has a perfectly good, commonsense explanation for why Island natives ate the visitors: as with so many tribes, the Islanders had ecologically depleted and despoiled the surrounding areas, and cannibalism was one of the few sources they had of protein. They were being perfectly rational in response to circumstances. And suggesting otherwise is simply patronizing, Eurocentric, racist nonsense. The very claim of ‘Otherness’ and ‘heterogeneity’ of cultures, constantly mouthed by postmodernists from Edward Said to Lyotard, is just a thinly disguised new form of imperialism, says Obeyesekere and his supporters.

“Yeow. Well, you can see the battle lines here. Yet once again, I want to suggest that both the orange and green approaches have important points that need to be incorporated into any truly integral historiography. They are both half-right, half-wrong—the constant refrain of the integralist.”

Carla Fuentes’s diminutive size was obscured by an energy aura that seemed about the size of a standard Mercedes. She continued to sizzle across the stage, never really touching down.

“As we have seen, the orange scientific historian is correct that there is a world of sensorimotor facts that are independent of any particular human mind. (Third tier would claim that although they are independent of human minds, they are not independent of Mind or Spirit, but that is another topic! [See ‘On the Nature of a Post-Metaphysical Spirituality,’ posted on this site.]) There are trillions of sensorimotor facts that pre-existed the emergence of humanity—the existence of atoms, stars, molecules, planets, galaxies, most forms of plant and animal life—and those dimensions of reality continue to exist with or without us (although holons at those levels mutually co-create each other; see SES). And when we humans behave in the sensorimotor world, we leave material artifacts that are also factual, even if those facts have information embedded in them that can only be seen from higher levels of development.

“Thus, for example, I might write a book. The book itself is a material object that can be investigated scientifically—it weighs this many grams, it was printed on this date by this publishing house, it was bought by this person, it was sold to this person, the author died on this date, he was buried in this spot, 22 people attended his funeral, his ashes were scattered at this location, his book went on to sell 124,000 copies, it was translated into 14 foreign languages, and so on, and so on, and so on. And orange scientific historiography has always tried to stay as close to those *facts* as possible, which is fine—and a very important part of the story.

“But the *meaning* of the book? The actual meaning of what the author wrote? Ooops. No amount of science will or can tell you that. That is an *interpretative* affair, an affair of hermeneutics, an affair of cultural backgrounds, linguistic practices, individual and cultural meanings, values, intentions, motivations. And none of *those* exist independently of the specific human minds perceiving them. And the green-meme historian knows this. *That* part of history is an interpretive affair, and we do not discover interpretations, we make them or co-create them. [See ‘Integral Art and Literary Theory, chaps. 4 and 5, *The Eye of Spirit*.]

“In other words, much of culture—and therefore cultural anthropology, ethnology, and history in general—is composed of texts. Not just books, but any and all communications that demand interpretation, which is to say, *all* communication: symbols, signs, rituals, celebrations, utterances, speech behavior, fantasies, visions, rites of passage, everyday communication, simple talking, story telling, motivations, intentions, you name it: open your mouth and somebody has to interpret what the hell you are saying. Linguistic intersubjectivity is a major carrier of this interpretive demand, so much so that Derrida went a bit overboard and claimed, ‘*There is nothing outside of the text!*’ Well, there are all sorts of things outside of linguistic interpretation, but nothing that is finally outside of interpretation, because the Left-Hand quadrants go all the way down, and even atomic holons are interpreting each other. But that does not deny the existence of the Right-Hand aspects, which are objective events in spacetime that are more-or-less open to scientific scrutiny.

“But scientific scrutiny is only half the story. Not just what does it do, but what does it mean? Scientific historiography can tell you much of the former, but hermeneutic historiography addresses the latter. Both are important; neither can be dismissed. But hermeneutics is clearly the more difficult half of the discipline, because it is dialogical, not just monological. Nevertheless, just because it is difficult, slippery, sloppy, and sliding, doesn’t mean interpretation can be tossed out as so much postmodern trash. Interpretation is an intrinsic part of the Kosmos at all levels, and there is no escaping that particular fact.

Moreover, different mentalities will interpret the same event in diametrically different ways—aye, there's the rub.

“Now, given that interpretations are built into history because they are built into the Kosmos at all levels, there are several ways to proceed. If you had to pick one insight that defines postmodernism, it is that we do not merely perceive the world, we interpret it (and therefore co-create it)—an insight that can be traced to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Heidegger, and down to today with Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard and crew. Moreover, different people in different times and places have created different interpretations of the world—have created different worldviews. *So, given that inescapable situation, how do we proceed?* How do we proceed in science, in philosophy, in historiography, and so on? Given the multiple mess that is culture—given the rambunctious *plurality of worldviews*—how do we even begin to understand the Other(s)?

“The Enlightenment, of course, basically gave us orange science, economics, and liberalism, all of which, in their early forms, shared orange's belief in a simple, monological, universal world, a world of sensorimotor facts, and thus the issue of multiple worldviews simply did not come up. What orange science did, once it emerged and broke free from mythic membership and the blue meme, was to take its newly discovered formal rationality and use it to investigate the sensorimotor world. Now it so happens that the fundamentals of the sensorimotor world, the world of empirical facts, are indeed universal. Diamond, cut, glass, yada yada yada. Enlightenment science therefore set out to free the world from mythic superstitions about sensory facts, and for the most, it succeeded brilliantly. Its positive accomplishments simply cannot be overrated or over-praised.

“But look how much orange science was leaving out! By sticking to sensorimotor or Right-Hand occasions, it was leaving out all the interior domains—consciousness, introspection, interpretations, worldviews, and so on. It would have been fine if empirical science simply said, ‘Our methods cannot reach those important domains, so we will remain silent about them.’ But science went one step further slipped into scientism by saying,

‘Those domains do not exist because our limited, partial, idiotically narrow methods can’t reach them.’ Well, okay, it didn’t exactly say that, did it? But that is exactly what it did—it denied the existence of the interiors altogether. And there was the real downside of the Enlightenment.

“The green-meme was the first to spot this catastrophe, and the first to really notice that the universe is a world of interpretations, not merely facts. And thus, as we were saying, where do you go from there?

“*There are two major courses of action* that you can take in the face of the *multiple interpretations* that do indeed constitute our world, and the postmodern world took both of them: pluralism and genealogy. The former was descriptive, the latter developmental.

“Pluralism—or pluralistic relativism—simply means that the interpretations that any person or any culture makes about the world should be judged by their own standards and criteria. A ‘meta-narrative’—which is a very bad thing, if you don’t know—is defined as any account of an Other that ascribes to that Other something other than the Other would ascribe to itself. That’s perfectly clear, eh?” The audience all laughed.

“In other words, metanarratives are ‘bad’ in the sense that we really shouldn’t impose our interpretations on others—i.e., on the Other. You look at a Van Gogh painting, you see angels of light descending on nature, I see a swaying wheat field. How dare you say that your interpretation is correct? And worse, how dare you take your fucking armies and invade my territory just so you can shove your interpretation of the world down my throat? This is called *imperialism* by any other name.

“I mean that point very seriously, friends. How are you to say your interpretation is *better* than mine? This is really the essence of the first major path through postmodernity: interpretations are inescapable, and all interpretations have an equal right to existence. Pluralism, relativism, and egalitarianism go hand in hand down this particular, and very important, road of postmodernism. This is also, you might note, by far the most popular postmodern route. Names associated with pluralistic relativism include Derrida, Lyotard,

aspects of later Wittgenstein, Michel de Certeau, Edward Said, Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish, and so on.

“The second major path through the post-Enlightenment, postmodern world—that is, the world in which both facts and interpretations are irreducible—is the genealogical. Now the first major approach, the pluralistic, is basically a type of hermeneutic across space: you find an Other—another text, another person, another culture—and you attempt to describe it from within, you attempt to understand it, you treat it with respect, care, and concern. You do not impose your interpretations or your judgments on the Other.

“The second major approach to postmodernism does all of that, *plus one more thing*: it follows the Other not just across space but across time. It attempts to understand the Other as the Other unfolds in history, and it attempts to see if there are any patterns in that temporal unfolding. This is genealogy in the broadest sense.

“If you’re curious, and I just know you are, there are two major subsets of genealogy: *ruptures* and *development*. The ruptures school, associated with Bachelard, Canguilhem, early Kuhn, and early Foucault, sees the various stages of development as being almost entirely random, with no connecting logic—only ruptures—between them. These changes don’t really merit the word ‘stages’—they are simply shifting epistemes, unanchored in any reality or any developmental patterns. This rupture genealogy actually shares much with the first road of pluralistic relativism, and both of those schools are generally comfortable with each other.

“The second genealogical subset is the developmental: it follows the various stages or waves of the Other across spacetime, and it looks carefully at those waves to see if there are any patterns in the unfolding.

“Now, as with any of these schools, there is a ‘good’ way and a ‘bad’ way to do developmental genealogy. The bad way—which almost all the original genealogists followed, of course—was to take *your* interpretation of the world, imagine that it is the highest stage of development in the entire universe, and then read the historical development of the Other

as a series of halting lurches toward to your own glorious stage. In the wake of the Enlightenment, of course, science was thought to be the pinnacle of progress, and so most of the early developmentalists tended to judge how ‘high’ or ‘low’ a culture was by how far away from Newton it stood. Coupled with a wacky interpretation of Darwinism, these social evolutionists did basically everything you do *not* want to do when you do developmental studies. They stood *outside* the cultures of the Other, took their own favorite interpretations of the world text (i.e., positivistic, reductionistic, Right-Hand only, a demented flatland Darwinism, egoic-rationality is the highest stage, there are no important altered states, etc. etc. etc.), and then used that ridiculous scale as an absolute, universal scale of human development against which all Others could be judged. Well duh....

“No present-day, postmodern developmentalist does any of that, although their critics always assume they do. ‘Good’ genealogy, rather, consists of an attempt to hermeneutically understand the worldview of any group of people in terms that *they themselves would agree with*. The first step in good genealogy consists of an interpretive entering into the worldview of those whose history and lineage is being delicately traced. The worldview or worldviews are then hermeneutically described over time, *with each wave always put in terms that the individuals themselves feel reflects their perceptions sympathetically* (or, if they are deceased, that they would likely accept, as far as can be determined). This is NOT a metanarrative in the Lyotard sense because it does not ascribe to the Other anything significant that the Other would not ascribe to itself. This is one of the many reasons that good genealogy falls under the rubric of postmodernism.

“There has been approximately one century of good genealogical studies. What they have found is that, in this pluralistic universe of multiple worldviews, *some worldviews actually develop over time*, and this development can be traced. Not everything in human consciousness or culture evolves, but *some* of it *does*, and any approach that claims to be integral will of course include these developmental and evolutionary currents.

“Let me give one example of a good genealogy. Carol Gilligan, in a wonderful book called *In a Different Voice*, examined a group of women’s attitudes toward abortion, among other things. She discovered, through careful dialogical research grounded in mutual understanding—that is, she talked with the subjects about how they felt and recorded their responses in terms that *the subjects themselves agreed with*—she discovered that most women start at a stage that was focused on the self and its immediate needs. That worldview, if it changed or developed over time, developed into a worldview that focused on helping others that are close to the person—Gilligan called this the ‘care’ stage. If that worldview changed over time, it changed into a worldview that was concerned with helping not just those close to the person, but all others who need help—Gilligan called this the ‘universal care’ stage. Everybody at those three stages agreed with her descriptions of them. Nothing was imposed on the women; their own views were simply dialogically drawn out.

“When Gilligan then looked at the overall results, she noticed that the women’s moral responses to her questions unfolded or developed in three waves or stages: selfish to care to universal care. Gilligan herself called these ‘hierarchical stages.’ Why ‘hierarchical’? Because each stage transcended and included its predecessors—but not vice versa. That is, each stage possessed all the capacities of its predecessor, plus something new. Each stage was an organic, nested growth, and thus, each was indeed deeper or higher in its moral capacity. When a woman moves from the selfish stage to the care stage, she can care about herself but *also* about others: she has everything found at the selfish stage PLUS an added capacity that the selfish stage lacks. Likewise, when she moves from the care stage to the universal care stage, she has added yet another capacity: she can care for herself, for those close to her, and for all others around the world who need help.

“That, of course, is a nested hierarchy of growth. Having discovered that organic pattern of growth—at least for that group—Gilligan could then indeed make some moral judgments about the degree of development of individuals in the group, but those judgments are inherent in the responses of the group, they are not imposed on the women by Gilligan—

they are inherent in the hermeneutic of the subjects themselves, not imposed from without. The developmental flow pattern, to be authentic, must grow from within and be elucidated from within. Further research then determines just how many different groups of women follow that growth pattern. In some cases, we find that developmental sequences are limited to one subculture; in others, to a large culture of many subgroups; and in some, the developmental patterns appear to be universal—but that claim is ALWAYS subservient to further research data. No responsible developmentalist has EVER imposed a developmental scheme on any culture without appropriate interior hermeneutic research supporting those suggestions (although virtually every critic claims they have, which frankly tells us a bit more about the critic than about the developmentalists).

“But, of course, notice: once Gilligan has found that there are three stages of moral unfolding for these women, wouldn’t a woman at stage 1 rather indignantly deny that there are higher stages? And since she is denying higher stages, isn’t Gilligan’s assertion that this stage-1 woman is at a lower stage than stage 2 and stage 3—isn’t that assertion a metanarrative in the bad sense, because the woman herself does *not* agree with that categorization of her experience? No, Gilligan’s judgment is not a metanarrative: Gilligan has simply pointed out that if the stage-1 response changes, then in every case she found, it changed to a stage-2 type of response (it went from selfish to care). The stage-1 woman, who has NOT changed to stage 2, therefore has not had the experience of stage 2 that would allow her to authentically deny stage 2’s validity in terms acceptable to those at stage 2. In other words, the stage-1 woman is actually committing an invalid metanarrative in that she is ascribing to stage 2 things that stage 2 does not ascribe to itself. Every stage-2 woman, on the other hand, has experienced stage 1, and thus the stage-2 woman can, in a non-metanarrative way, say that stage 2 is higher, wider, deeper than stage 1. In other words, the denial of hierarchical stages is itself an invalid metanarrative. From Ferrer to Tarnas to Hickman to Delores to Beliot, you can see these invalid and inauthentic metanarratives

parading as sensitive, caring, empathic resonances, whereas they are hermeneutic violence by any other name.

“Okay, fine, but why even do these types of studies? Well, here’s one answer. I don’t know about you, but as a woman, when I first read *In a Different Voice*, I was checking my responses as fast I could. What the women said made sense to me, and how Gilligan summarized it all made sense to me—and by God or by Goddess, I wanted to be stage 3! I did not want to be stage 1 or stage 2. I was glad that many, maybe most, of my responses were of the universal care stage—stage 3—but in several instances I was shocked to find care and even selfish responses dominating. And by analyzing my responses with the developmental scale Carol discovered, I tell you, I grew up a little bit just reading that book.

“So that’s one of the major reasons that we do developmental studies. Folks, if you want transformation and growth, you have to know which to grow, yes? Organic developmental studies can suggest a lay of the higher land, thus helping orient us to our own higher potentials, or at least suggesting various types of higher potentials. Of course, we have to hold all these maps very, very lightly—but what else is new? ‘Holding lightly’ does not mean ‘toss on the trash can.’ Moreover, there are exceptions to every rule and every scheme, and you do not have to be involved in pigeonholing or rigid categorization to find useful hints in carefully researched organic maps. We keep calling these ‘organic’ because, like all natural organisms—from amoeba to roses to robins—they show growth and development.

“But here’s the other thing, the incredibly important thing, that organic genealogy does: it gets us out of the dead-end of pluralism and extreme postmodernism. Genealogy rescues us from pluralistic relativism, from flatland egalitarianism, from the deconstructive postmodernism that is the epidemic of our age. Genealogy is the cure for the postmodern nightmare that has ruined not only academia but much of culture at large. In short, genealogy is the cure for pluralism.

“And I’m sure you can see exactly how it does so, yes?”

“Take Gilligan’s example. The pluralistic postmodernist would claim that, apart from such obvious injunctions as ‘don’t harm another,’ all individual and cultural perspectives are essentially equal, and thus all of the women’s responses are equally valid, because who are we to judge what is higher or lower? Who are we to take an abstract standard and impose it on these women, saying that some of their responses are lower or higher than others? Let all the stages run rampant, let all the responses be given an equal respect in this glorious egalitarian world.

“Well, we have had three decades of the selfish stage running rampant, haven’t we? Boomeritis is exactly part of the result. The reason that genealogy is the cure for pluralism is that delicately done research on cultural patterns as they unfold over time suggests various organic patterns *that the culture itself announces* (which is why this is not an exteriorly imposed metanarrative). These flow patterns suggest judgments inherent in the cultural unfolding itself (and inherent in various patterns of social learning), patterns that are not imposed from without, and thus these natural, internal, organic patterns help us establish a moral compass in the midst of the otherwise flatland, rudderless display that is pluralistic relativism. Moreover, these unfolding holistic patterns show us how to actually arrive at a wave of consciousness development where all stances can be treated fairly, impartially, worldcentricly—which is the actual, stated aim of authentic postmodernism anyway.

“Okay, let’s take a breath and see where we are. We are looking at the historical reactions to the orange Enlightenment and especially its unfortunate downsides. We are at the point where the green meme started to emerge and noticed that interpretations and the subjective component of reality (or consciousness itself) are just as important, sometimes more important, than the objective-factual world. Green, of course, is also called the ‘subjectivistic self,’ precisely because it is so sensitive to these interior dimensions.

“This post-Enlightenment, post-orange, post-modern world found that, in place of a single universal world of sensorimotor facts, there was (also) a multitude of worlds of different interpretations. In the wake of that somewhat shocking realization, there were two

major responses: take the multiple interpretations as given and irreducible, with none inherently superior to the others. This was *the standard green-meme approach* (that is, the worldview as it evolved in the green structure)—an approach we are calling pluralistic relativism, and an approach that came to define postmodernism itself. Of course, it also became the home of the MGM and boomeritis... and all the nightmares therein. But its positive and healthy aspects should not therefore be forgotten or ignored.

“The second approach agreed with the first in that there is not a single pre-given world but a multitude of pluralistic interpretations. *But it went one step further and organically traced those interpretations over time.* And what it found was that in many cases, those interpretations *arranged themselves* along a nested hierarchy of growth, an organic developmental unfolding of increasingly encompassing waves. In other words, some (not all) aspects of worldviews organically developed over time, with senior worldviews transcending but including their juniors—just as organisms transcended but included cells, which transcended but included molecules, which transcended but included atoms.

“These organic growth hierarchies were still pluralistic in many important ways, because each stage or wave was seen to be a crucial ingredient in the overall spiral of development. All of the pluralistic worldviews were seen to be fundamentally important in the overall unfolding, and they *all* continued to play a crucial role at any subsequent stage. Unlike the early developmentalists, who saw each ‘higher’ wave getting rid of the nasty ‘lower’ wave, good genealogy discovered that *all* waves remain crucial in overall development and remain functional in all subsequent waves. Each wave was therefore fully honored and embraced, just as it was, AND some waves were seen to be more encompassing, more inclusive, more caring, and more compassionate than others: self to care to universal care, for example. The waves of development were waves of increasing care and consciousness.

“That second approach was organic genealogy in its many forms. Not only was organic genealogy the way out of pluralism, it was essentially the second-tier approach to postmodernism, the yellow-turquoise road through the postmodern world (and thus it was,

initially, much less common than the green-meme path). It was a constructive postmodernism in that it transcended and included green: it accepted and embraced the pluralism wonderfully freed by the green meme, but then, instead of letting the fragments run riot in a rampage of despair, it wove them together—based on an interior hermeneutic of their own accord—into an integral spectrum of consciousness, a nested holarchy of growth and inclusion that embraced each and every worldview on its own terms, but laced together into a tapestry of increasing care and consciousness.

“Second-tier or integral postmodernism could succeed at this task because development itself was increasingly understood to be a staggeringly complex affair. It was not that there was one line of development that clunked along through a ladder of linear stages, judgmentally jettisoning previous ones like icky worn-out skin. Rather, there were multiple developmental lines or streams running through the various levels or waves of development, so that individuals and cultures were always a complex amalgam of some capacities being highly developed, some that were only of medium development, and others that showed little or no development at all. Not to mention that authentic altered *states* are available at virtually every *stage* (see below). Thus, ‘ranking’ a person or culture as higher or lower along a single monolithic scale is impossible (which was the crude, if pioneering, mistake made by virtually all early developmentalists, from Joachim of Flora to Auguste Comte). This likewise means that just because one culture exists later in time than another does not necessarily mean that the former is ‘higher’ in all or even most ways. Earlier cultures could have excelled in some lines and in some states (and we have abundant evidence that many of them did)—but you don’t have to get into a PMS snit and trash the many positive gains of the Enlightenment to make that simple point!

“Historically, we see this second-tier road through the postmodern world in the works of scholars such as Schelling, James Mark Baldwin (America’s greatest psychologist), the remarkable Jean Gebser (pioneer in worldview genealogy), Jürgen Habermas (the world’s greatest living philosopher), aspects of the late Foucault (as he began to move beyond rupture

genealogy toward organic genealogy), Aurobindo (the world's greatest philosopher-sage)...”

Carla paused and looked up. “Have I used enough superlatives to tilt the case my way?”

Fuentes kept laughing to herself. For some reason Kim started laughing too, and I’m not sure I understood any of it. “And down to today with Robert Kegan, Carol Gilligan, Bill Torbert, Jane Loevinger, Jan Sinnott, Jenny Wade, Susanne Cook-Greuter, Clare Graves, Spiral Dynamics, and many, many others.

“Okay, with all of that we have come full circle, or come back, anyway, to Sahlins and Obeyesekere. Remember those guys? Natives, James Cook, a Friday night luau featuring the Captain’s liver? I hope all of you realize that this debate is frightfully complex and sophisticated, and that I am trading on the loosest of the generalizations when I say this, but here it is in a nutshell: Obeyesekere is basically representing an orange-science historiography, and Sahlins, a green-pluralism historiography. Since both of those are first-tier memes, neither can see that they are both essentially correct—or, as we always say, both are half-right, half-wrong. Of course there are a set of sensorimotor facts involved, which, as facts, are not open to very much interpretation—they either did or did not occur as generally described (e.g., exactly what date did the Lono and Ku festivals start and end? How many were in Cook’s party the night he was murdered? Where did it happen? Who did it? With what?) It turns out that Obeyesekere, by a very careful, very impressive reading of these types of sensorimotor facts—facts that in most cases neither side contests—is able to poke several very large holes in the specific interpretations of Sahlins, which he does not convincingly counter. But Sahlins’s general overview position—that the natives had a different worldview than the European practical rationality—is so persuasive that in those areas he is clearly the most convincing historian, and the majority of those following the debate seem to agree.

“Evidently, both of them are onto an important piece of the puzzle. Sahlins, as a good green-postmodernist, actually smuggles in a ton of universal-orange science facts while denying the validity of universal-orange science altogether; and Obeyesekere actually argues

for the irreducibility of the interpretive worldview of the Other, even as he sneaks his own orange interpretation into the natives' minds when they aren't looking. But we needn't go over that ground again: any truly integral, second-tier historiography would consciously, openly, transparently use a judicious combination of facts and interpretations, brought together by an integral methodology that specifically allocates a space for each in numerous, complex interactions.

“Now, in this simple overview, I have briefly used the 8 major interpretive schemes elucidated by Spiral Dynamics. We feel that if Sahlins used the red-meme interpretation for most of the natives' actions, they would make much more sense. As it is, Sahlins attempts to reconstruct from scratch a type of old-fashioned structuralist mythology that just doesn't fit with the sensorimotor facts—and remember, interpretations are not fully bound to, or reducible to, sensorimotor facts, but they must mesh with them in a general fashion or nobody would accept the interpretation in the first place. No mythic system whatsoever maintains that in the earth realm apples fall upward and men give birth. Some of Sahlins's interpretations of the latter ilk—badly askance with the facts, which Obeyesekere skillfully demonstrates and Sahlins cannot adequately defend.

“We here at IC think it would be different using a more sophisticated genealogical array of interpretive schemes, such as the work of Clare Graves and Spiral Dynamics. But we certainly don't insist on this particular model! A historian might find useful any number of interpretive possibilities. But if that historian wishes to escape the insuperable difficulties and contradictions of being merely an orange-science historian or a green-pluralist historian, then the only viable way that has been demonstrated so far is to include—in ADDITION TO orange facts and green interpretations—a second-tier genealogical array of interpretive development.

“In a book called *Integral Psychology*, one of our colleagues here at IC assembled over 100 genealogical maps of consciousness unfolding, taken from the premodern, modern, and postmodern sources (including those of Spiral Dynamics, Bob Kegan, Jane Loevinger,

Plotinus, Aurobindo, Lady Tsogyal, St. Teresa....). What is so astonishing about all of them is a very general agreement as to the broad contours of consciousness flowering, especially if *we hold these maps lightly*, and see their unfolding waves as simply orienting generalizations in this blooming, buzzing confusion that we call the world. At the very least, these 100 maps offer the historian a rich smorgasboard of interpretive schemes that might help him or her help make more sense of various Others in space and time, as long as these are taken as suggestions, not rigid categorizations.

“Okay, then! Let me conclude by telling you our basic suggestions for an integral historiography.

“We call this approach, as many of you know, an ‘all-quadrants, all-levels, all-lines, all-states, all-types’ approach. And we suggest that individuals adopt these features more or less in the order they are listed: that is, start with ‘all quadrants’ and see if that makes sense to you; then add ‘all levels’—or add the major genealogical levels or waves of consciousness (which are also some of the major ways that human beings interpret the world), and see if that makes sense to you; if so, then add the ‘all lines’ aspect—namely, the idea that there isn’t just a single scale of genealogical unfolding: there are numerous developmental lines or streams proceeding through the various levels or waves); and then, if you want, add ‘all states’—a person can have a peak experience or altered *state* at virtually any *stage* of development (although those states will then be interpreted through the lens of the stages of development that are present); and then add ‘all types,’ not in the sense of rigidly categorizing people into typologies, but in the sense that, if you do use typologies, make sure you try to choose among as wide a variety as possible so as to marginalize as few as possible.

“Well, that’s a bit much, perhaps? Then just start with the quadrants. Let me give you a quick run through the quadrants, giving examples of each, to show what is involved in an actual methodology. As many of you know, the four quadrants (the inside and outside of the individual and collective) are just a variation on the ‘Big Three’—or the three dimensions of reality registered by virtually all known cultures: the beautiful, the good, and the true—that

is, a subjective-aesthetic dimension of ‘I,’ a moral dimension of ‘we,’ and an objective dimension of ‘it’—art, morals, and science, for example. These three dimensions are the realm of 1<sup>st</sup> person, 2<sup>nd</sup> person, and 3<sup>rd</sup> person—I, we, and it. (We include ‘we’ and ‘you’ in second person to emphasize mutuality.) The four quadrants simply point out that the ‘it’ or 3<sup>rd</sup> person dimension also has singular and plural forms—or it and its (giving us an I, we, it, and its quadrant).

[You can see a simple diagram of this in the Introduction to CW7, posted on this site, and it is fully elucidated in SES, summarized in *A Brief History of Everything*, and hyper-summarized in *A Theory of Everything*.]

“Now, most traditional western historiography, since the Enlightenment, has been done by the orange-meme, which, with its scientific inclination, attempted to focus mostly on presenting ‘just the facts’ as they unfolded historically. When it came to the low-level interpretations required by this approach, these historians simply used their orange-meme interpretations (of ‘practical rationality’—e.g., Obeyesekere) without realizing that they were merely interpretations, and that there were other, sometimes more legitimate or appropriate, interpretations of those facts.

“Still, this general approach has its place, because it focuses on the Right-Hand quadrants, or the objective, sensorimotor aspects of all occasions (and clearly the Right-Hand quadrants are crucial ingredients of any integral approach). In the Upper-Right quadrant, this approach focuses on describing, as accurately as possible, the behavior of individuals, and any objective factors that impinge on an individual’s behavior. In the Lower-Right quadrant, it focuses on the behavior of objective systems—from social systems to ecosystems to techno-economic bases of production to concrete modes of communication. This is the classic field of objective social sciences, physical anthropology, archeology, and so on, approached with tools ranging from dynamic systems theory to chaos and complexity theories to social data research techniques. It attempts to present ‘just the facts’ when it comes to social systems and their interactions with individuals, ecosystems, geophysical systems, and other objective

realities. When it comes to historiography, these Right-Hand approaches attempt to describe individual and collective behavior over time, and to do so as empirically as possible.

“Classic Right-Hand approaches to anthropology and history have discovered, for example, that in the Lower-Right quadrant, humanity generally developed from foraging to horticultural to agrarian to industrial to informational. Those basic anthropological facts and their historical order are not contested (even by green pluralists, although they would not use the word ‘developed,’ believing instead that these are all equivalently valued modes, although they contradictorily devalue the industrial). The point is that, in the Lower Right, these unfolding modes of production are a crucial ingredient of humanity’s trek through time, so important that the various forms of historical materialism (Marxism and Neomarxism) have made the Lower Right the single greatest determinant of the other features of history (and therefore humanity). If you look at recent statistical analyses of, say, the percentages of each societal type—foraging, horticultural, herding, maritime, agrarian, industrial, informational—that engage in various cultural practices (from bride price to war, from games of chance to circumcision, from female deities to male deities), you can’t help but be struck by how powerfully the Lower-Right quadrant affects the consciousness of culture and of individuals: you can see how Marx was led to state that it is not the consciousness of individuals that determines their social-economic conditions but the social conditions that determine their consciousness. Again, he overstates the case. Still, although we at IC do not give such a privileged or dominant position to the Lower Right, it is clearly ‘one-fourth’ of the story, so to speak, and needs to be fully included and honored in any integral approach. Indeed, the influence of the ‘base’—the Lower-Right quadrant—is really quite stunning. It is, perhaps, the single strongest determinant of *the average level* of consciousness in any given society. Classic Lower-Right approaches include Comte, Feuerbach, Marx, Lenski.

“Numerous historians continue giving wonderful accounts of this quadrant and its important role in history (even if most them continue to over-value it). See, for example, the rollicking *Guns, Germs, and Steel*. That’s for the Lower Right. As for a reminder of the

importance of the Upper-Right quadrant in historiography: did you know that the Enlightenment might never have occurred without the high caffeine content of the coffee that became wildly popular at the time? Check it out:

“As important as the Right-Hand paths and methods are, there have always been approaches to understanding the Kosmos—and humanity’s place in it—that investigate not just the exteriors and their behavior but the interiors and their meaning. These Left-Hand approaches attempt to understand the interiors: consciousness, meaning, interpretation, depth, the within, values, intentions.... This is generally the province of the interpretive, introspective, hermeneutic, and phenomenological cultural studies. As we have seen, the major approaches here have been pluralistic relativism and organic genealogy. Both of these approaches share a pluralistic orientation, in that they agree that there is not a single, pre-given world of monovalent interpretations that are universally true for all peoples. Pluralistic relativism claims that there are a multitude of pluralistic ultimates, each more or less equally valid, with no universal or cross-cultural metanarratives available that can pronounce on judgments of worth. Developmental or organic genealogy agrees that that is often the case, but points out that substantial research suggests that many of these worldviews themselves developed over time, and that *within* the hermeneutic horizon of the worldviews, they themselves suggest or agree that some are more developed, some are less developed, and the more developed themselves legitimately make normative judgments about their less developed juniors. This gives us a scale of adjudication—not all views are of equal worth in all circumstances—that allows us to escape the performative contradictions that plague the pluralistic relativism schools.

“But, you see, you can use the four quadrants themselves whether you are a pluralistic relativist or a developmental genealogist, because the four quadrants are four *equal* dimensions present in *all* occasions. When it comes to just the quadrants *themselves*, there is no hierarchy or ranking involved, because all four are irreducible and crucial ingredients of any event. All cultures have access to first, second, and third person realities, and the four

quadrants simply remind us to take all of those dimensions into account when trying to understand any event, human or otherwise. This is why even green postmodernists are very comfortable using the quadrants, which is great. And certainly a move toward a more integral approach.

“To return to the Left-Hand approaches to historiography. These approaches stress the importance of including the interiors, even if, like their Right-Hand counterparts, they often go too far and dramatically overemphasize the importance of their quadrants. In fact, sometimes the Left-Hand approaches go so far that they deny the existence of the Right-Hand realities altogether! As we have seen, most forms of (extreme) postmodernism claim that there are ‘no facts, only interpretations’—that is, no Right-Hand dimensions, only Left-Hand. The classic postmodern move actually *denies all quadrants except the Lower Left*—it denies all realities except cultural interpretations (‘the social construction of reality’)—it even attempts to reduce individual subjective consciousness (the ‘death of the subject’) to nothing but a play of the vast impersonal cultural system of social-linguistic signifiers and/or nondiscursive power formations (an approach which bizarrely slides into a Lower-Right type of collective-exterior approach—but that’s another story [see **Sidebar E**]).

“Of course, these postmodernists—like their counterparts on the Lower Right, the historical materialists—had good reasons to get so excited about the role of their favorite quadrant: the Lower Left (or cultural background) is an extremely important, unavoidable, irreducible dimension of any occasion, and it has a profound effect on individuals, on the course of history, and on our understanding of it. But to incorporate that profound realization we needn’t go to extremes and deny the existence of the other quadrants or attempt to reduce them to cultural interpretations. What we need to do, rather, is simply realize that the world is not merely the sum total of exterior facts, but also includes interior consciousness, intersubjectivity, meanings, values, and intentions—and their own way, their existence is as ‘factual’—as ontologically real and irreducible—as that of objective facts.

These ‘subjective facts’ need to be placed alongside ‘objective facts’ as irreducible realities in the Kosmos.

“Classic investigators of the Upper-Left quadrant (the interior of the individual, or the spectrum of consciousness as it appears in an individual) include Plotinus, Augustine, Freud, Jung, Buddha, Asanga and Vasubandhu, William James, Clare Graves, Abe Maslow.... Classic investigators of the Lower-Left quadrant (cultural context, background, group identities, hermeneutics, interpretation) include Nietzsche, Dilthey, Heidegger, Gebser, Taylor, Kuhn....

“An ‘all-quadrant’ historiography therefore proceeds by conscientiously attempting to acknowledge, investigate, and elucidate the realities in all four quadrants of existence: the intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social, using the techniques and methodologies that have, for the most part, already been developed by specialists in each of those quadrants. For the Right-Hand quadrants: the individual and social sciences—behaviorism, empirical-analytic measures, monological surveys, statistical analyses, and the extensive variety of evolutionary and systems sciences (including chaos and complexity theories); for the Left-Hand quadrants: the hermeneutic, introspective, phenomenological, intersubjective, dialogical, interpretive, and genealogical methodologies. See, for example, *Brief History* and *The Eye of Spirit* for an elucidation of many of these suggestions.

“So that’s the ‘all-quadrant’ part. If you are comfortable with that, you might decide to add the ‘all-level’ part. This is simply adding a genealogical or organic-developmental aspect to the quadrants. You don’t have to do this, it goes without saying, yes? You can use pluralistic relativism and local hermeneutics for your interpretive dimensions—you can be ‘all-quadrant’ without adding ‘all-level.’ But we feel that a substantial amount of evidence warrants the addition of a developmental component to the quadrants—we believe, actually, that all four quadrants evolve (or ‘tetra-evolve’ together in mutual interaction), and that acknowledging these organic patterns adds considerable richness to historiographical interpretations.

“Moving from ‘all-quadrants’ to ‘all-quadrants, all-levels’ is often the hardest part for many people, and we try to be very sensitive in deciding when to suggest this move. Almost nobody has any trouble with all-quadrants; most people, in fact, immediately see their importance and move to use them right away. But levels or waves is more difficult—and yes, frankly, it is green that usually resists the notion of levels, while yellow intuitively embraces it from the start. (Recall that research suggests that the intuitive understanding the hierarchical Spiral is one of the defining characteristics of yellow and second-tier in general.)

“Based on research to date, it certainly seems that some developmental levels are universal. For example, in the cognitive line of development, as far as we can tell, children everywhere develop images, then word-symbols, then concepts, then rules. We know of no exceptions to this general sequence (it is cross-cultural and universal). This sequence emerges in an order that cannot be altered by social conditioning or environmental circumstances (because each senior level includes as components the elements of the junior, which is why you cannot skip stages—just as you cannot go from atoms to cells and skip molecules).

“Likewise with the moral line of development. Infants begin their moral development at a type of pre-conventional stage, which means that they have not yet been socialized into their particular culture. This does not mean that infants show no moral capacity, only that it has not yet been given the form and structure of the local culture. As that begins to happen, children move from pre-conventional to conventional: they become socialized and conventionalized, often ending up in a type of conformist or group-bound ethics. IF they continue their growth (and not all do), they can move beyond some of their culture’s norms and mores and become post-conventional—they can norm the norms, reflect on their culture’s ethics and decide whether or not they are worthy of embracing.

“So when we say there are universals to the cognitive and moral lines of development, for example, we mean those very general sequences and waves, such as the ones I just described. We do *not* necessarily mean the specific details given those lines by specific researchers like Piaget and Kohlberg (there are, in fact, some problems with their

formulations, although continued research clearly indicates that much of their work is still valid). I believe that it is of the utmost importance for ‘good genealogy’ that you take the loosest, most generalized approach possible to the levels and waves of development. When you are trying to make universal judgments—and you have no choice but to make universal judgments (even the anti-universal pluralists make numerous universal truth claims, as we have seen, only they try to hide theirs)—but when you are making universal judgments, the standards for doing so become extraordinarily high, because the potential costs of misjudgment are so high.

“So that is why we at IC recommend (1) definitely continuing research into the detailed, specific, technical models of development, such as those offered by Clare Graves, Jane Loevinger, Susanne Cook-Greuter, Jenny Wade, Robert Kegan, William Torbert, James Mark Baldwin, Jan Sinnott, Carol Gilligan, Patricia Arlin, Cheryl Armon, and so on. But (2), when you are doing historiography, or when you are offering universal overviews of any sort, then use the most generalized developmental schema that you can—such as egocentric to ethnocentric to worldcentric, or impulsive to conformist to autonomous, or preconventional to conventional to postconventional, and so on. (Of course, you can use the more detailed stage models in a particular culture, but if and only if a reasonable amount of organic genealogy conducted *in that culture* has given you permission to do so.) Also, if you remember that a person at any stage of consciousness can have an altered state or peak experience of any of the transpersonal-spiritual realms, then there is no credible evidence that denies that some aspects of consciousness develop in a genealogical sequence.

“Now that simple sequence—say, preconventional to conventional to postconventional—is enough to get you from ‘all-quadrants’ to ‘all-quadrants, all-levels,’ because now you can use that genealogy to realize that each of the basic waves has a very *different worldview*, with different values, different needs, different perceptions, different drives, and so on. This gives you something that mere hermeneutics and pluralism cannot: a

scale of depth. And this is enough to rescue your entire approach from the self-contradictions of pluralistic relativism.

“Once you have started using levels of development—and this, we believe, will help move your own center of gravity from green to yellow—then you might be more open to the specific research suggesting just which developmental scales are universal and which are bound to particular cultures. Some scales are clearly universal, or shared by all humans—we gave two examples; others are shared by all humans in a particular culture; others only in a particular subculture. *Integral Psychology* contains charts with over 100 developmental scales from premodern, modern, and postmodern sources. We feel that the general similarity in so many of these maps suggests a good-enough universal current of development running throughout humanity—a great River of Life, as it were—and that the various developmental models are each merely rough snapshots of this great River. All of the developmental models are limited because none of them can capture the River in all its rushing, roiling glory. But many of them are useful because they suggest various features of the River that can be universally seen. Exactly which of the details of the models are universal depends, in the last analysis, on actual genealogical research, which is why we make no specific universal claims unless research corroborates that. The two (very general) universal genealogies I gave above—for cognitive and moral development—are of this general sort, and so we feel justified in using those scales as we attempt hermeneutical understanding of the Other—any Other, at least on this planet!

“I personally believe that the 8 major waves first outlined by Clare Graves do appear to be universal at this time, which is why we often use the Graves levels (and Spiral Dynamics) for a genealogical hermeneutic. But keep in mind that this is still only one index of development, and it does not deny the usefulness of dozens or even hundreds of other models, each of which might tell us something important about the great River. But the evidence suggests to me—and many other scholars—that the general waves discovered by Graves unfolded phylogenetically as well ontogenetically. As long as we self-consciously

criticize these conceptions every time we apply them, then we are justified in moving forward in this genealogical hermeneutics.

“Some scholars feel that all 8 Graves levels do not (yet) have enough evidence to warrant using them for a good-enough universal hermeneutic and historiography. They sometimes feel more comfortable with Jean Gebser’s simpler genealogy: archaic, magic, mythic, rational, integral. Others feel comfortable with only the three, very general waves: preconventional, conventional, postconventional. All of those choices are okay with me, tell you the truth. The essential point is that, because only organic genealogy can overcome pluralism, then any of the above will serve you well enough in your quest for a more integral, more inclusive, more expansive historiography.

“Once you are comfortable with levels, its easy to add lines (and thus go from ‘all quadrants, all levels’ to ‘all quadrants, all levels, all lines’). If you have acknowledged waves, the streams part is easy. The simple point is that there is not a single, monolithic, universal ladder of development—a single scale against which all individuals and all cultures can be monologically judged as being ‘higher’ or ‘lower.’ That is exactly the core of *bad* genealogy and involves pretty much everything you want to avoid. So study those bad approaches well, kids—this is what you do NOT want to be when you grow up.

“The constructive postmodern approach to genealogy consists of the realization that there are numerous developmental streams that move through the general waves of development in a relatively independent fashion. At this time, there appears to be at least two dozen developmental lines for which we have some sort of empirical evidence [see *The Eye of Spirit* and *Integral Psychology*]. Accordingly, an individual can be at a fairly high level of development in some lines, medium in others, and lower in still others—all at the same time. Thus, overall development is a wildly individual and idiosyncratic affair, and there is little that is linear in about it.

“Now add the concept of ‘all states,’ and you can see how truly nonlinear overall development is. A person at any level/wave/stage of development can have an altered state

or peak experience. These peak experiences not only happen to most people at some time, they have been crucial motivators in many great historical events. Whether you see them as ‘mere hallucinations’ or glimpses into ‘higher realms’ (or both), you probably cannot understand history very well without them. From Joan of Arc to Rasputin, from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Moses, altered states have been primary motivators of humanity.

“Lastly, and very quickly, ‘all types.’ Some typologies are vertical, and therefore often involve a type of developmental scale. If so, we include those in the ‘all-levels’ part. But many typologies are ‘horizontal’ and simply involve useful classifications of the types of character, gender orientation, style, inclinations, and so on, that are available to men and women. As usual, we really do need to be careful that these aren’t used to pigeonhole people. At the same time, a good typology can be extremely useful in gaining various kinds of self-understanding. Think of the many good uses that have come from the Myers-Briggs classification, based on Jung’s 4 major types (thinking, feeling, sensing, intuition). More recently, many people have found the Enneagram to be a very useful typology. In its horizontal form, it consists of 9 types that can be present at any of the major stages of development, so that, for example, you might be cognitive yellow 5, moral orange 9, and so on. [See *A Theory of Everything* for more on this.]

“One of the most important typologies now in play is that of Carol Gilligan, who, in addition to outlining 3 general stages in the hierarchy of female development, suggested that men and women progress through the hierarchical stages of development with a different style or voice: men tend to be more agentic, using a logic of rights and justice; whereas women tend to be more relational, using a logic of care and responsibility. Frankly, although research clearly supports her 3 hierarchical stages, research supporting her claim on the male-female typology at each stage (autonomous versus relational) is very spotty (the latest research shows that ‘in reporting moral reasoning, men use the terms of care and responsibility as often, or more often, than women’—pretty much the opposite of Gilligan’s claims); but other research is more positive. In any event, since our motto is ‘Follow the

Evidence!,’ we always try to let research decide these issues. What we do in the meantime is make sure that our model can accommodate the research. Should it support Gilligan’s claims in this regard, then we include the Gilligan typology as being applicable to virtually every major stage of development: that is, males *on average* tend to develop through the hierarchical levels or waves of consciousness using somewhat more agentic moral responses, and women *on average* develop through the *same* hierarchical levels using more communal responses. As usual, the intra-gender variations are greater than the inter-gender variations, so there is a great deal of variability here. But many theorists—from Deborah Tannen to Lesa Powell to Belencki et al.—have found suggestive evidence that men and women do speak with a different voice, even if they develop through the same, basic, gender-neutral levels. Tracking this different voice in history would then be a good idea, right?

“Okay, boys and girls, that’s the overall picture: a quick summary of an integral model of historiography that is ‘all quadrants, all levels, all lines, all states, all types.’ You get the general picture, yes?”